John Garang de Mabior died in Uganda, and was deeply buried by the SPLM

By Aleu Ayieny Aleu details of late Garang death

The historical background for Standards and Recommended Practices for Aircraft Accident Inquires were first adopted by the council on 11th April 1951 pursuant to Article 37 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago 1944) and were designated as Annex 13 to the Convention. This Annex directs the Council to determine the most practicable means of ensuring that the fullest possible advantage will be taken of the specialized knowledge of such experts and notify all contracting states accordingly, and urge all contracting states to co-operate in the use of such experts so as to contribute to the safety of navigation.

This article imposes an obligation on the state in which the aircraft accident occurs to institute an inquiry and to conduct an inquiry in accordance to ICAO procedure. The same article gives the state in which the aircraft is registered the opportunity to appoint observers to represent the state at the inquiry.

In fact, according to Annex 13, the investigation should have included:

1. Russia as the state of design and a manufacturer.
2. Uganda as the state of the operator and the state of registry and concerned about fatalities to its citizens.
3. Sudan as the state of occurrence and state having interest in the accident by virtue of fatalities to its citizens.

In this particular case several countries such as U.S.A, Kenya, U.K., and Norway volunteered. Later the U.K. and Norway backed out. The U.S. and Kenya remained as advisors on the basis of qualifications to assist accredited representatives of Sudan and Uganda. Our brothers from Uganda came to New Site fully convinced that the helicopter crashed inside Sudan on Luthele Mountain approximately 26 km from the known Ugandan border where they have their border guards and wildlife rangers. The day we arrived at the crash site and used GPS and Thuraya Satellite phones, everything was reading that we were in Uganda. Our Ugandan brothers took advantage of the equipment error to convince the Americans and Kenyans that Uganda should be the State of Occurrence. I remember raising objections about the accuracy of the instruments and gave them the example of Lokichogio to Lodware in Kenya which the same instruments read as Sudan. Lathule Mountains is home to the Thawuz tribe in Sudan which the Ugandans have never heard of.

The Americans came up with a compromise stating that the helicopter crashed in Uganda and somersaulted into Sudan. The SPLM representatives never new about Article 13 and the importance of the State of Occurrence, and blindly trusted Ugandans and Americans advice allowing Ugandans to get away with the status of State of Occurrence.

During the first meeting in Kampala, after we brought back the contents of the CVR (Black Box) and the damaged FDR from Moscow, I was struck by a statement made by Dr. Johns of U.S.A. which was supported by Kenya, Uganda, and the Northern Sudanese aspect of the delegation. He said "According to chapter 3.1 of Annex 13, the sole objective of this investigation of an accident or incident shall be the prevention of accidents and other incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability."

However, it is stated in Annex 13 in Article 5.4.1 that "Any judicial or administrative proceedings to apportion blame or liability should be separate from any investigation conducted under the provisions of this Annex". The investigation according to Annex 13 only raises questions that it will not answer as it is not their interest to apportion blame and liability. The raised questions from Article 13 could be a reason to constitute a judicial proceeding. I have always insisted that it is Sudanese and Ugandan people who are aggrieved because the aircraft contained fourteen victims six who were Ugandans. The aggrieved Sudanese and Ugandan families and the public of Dr John Garang have the right to demand the formation of a judicial commission. The GONU whose 1st V/President was killed should form such a commission. The GOSS whose president was killed could do the same. The SPLM/A whose chairman and C-in-C was killed could do it. The immediate family of Dr John can do it.

Finally the remaining member of the original SPLM/A High Command who has inherited and benefited from the tragic death of Cdr. Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, Cdr. William Nyuon, Cdr. Arok Thon Arok, and finally Dr John Garang should be seen seeking and hunting for the cause of tragedies to his comrades. This remaining comrade should not think that who ever claims foul play in the death of Dr John is an attempt to exhume Dr John, blow life in it and return him to all his former positions.
The commission or a hired International Consultancy could start judicial investigation using the following hints. Aircraft crash site inspection (probably crime scene) the site was violated by the forces that discovered the crashed aircraft two days before the arrival of experts.
-Bodies were randomly removed
-Aircraft parts were tampered with
-Passengers belongings which did not burn and scattered during the impact disappeared.
-Only a few items identified as belonging to the 1st Vice President such as the computer, satellite telephone, pistol, and rifles were reported to have been returned to the family.

Conclusion

1. The innocent violation of the crash site (crime scene) by non-experts made it difficult to perform an on-site forensic investigation.
2. The political urgency to separate bodies and hurry them for burial could not give accurate forensic conclusions. I am afraid some Sudanese body parts went to Uganda and vice-versa.
3. There was no way to know whether the bodies had died because of the crash impact or ballistics trauma.
4. The crashed plane debris was not thoroughly examined to exclude the possibility of external interference.
5. Several small arms spent ammunition were seen scattered at the crash site and no body bothered to examine whether they were firing pin triggered or by helicopter explosion fire.
6. The height of the mountain was (5350 ft.) and negotiating it to:
-The first impact area (FIA)
-The midway area (MWA)
-The main wreckage area (MRA)
was a daunting and dangerous affair especially to the elderly and members who hail from non-mountainous areas. Most of them would lie down when they made it to the top. Few reached all three areas because climbing down and out of the deep cuttings was very dangerous. Not much time was given to close inspection of the debris because nobody would wish to get caught by darkness on top of that mountain.

B. Wreckage Inspection
1. Main avionics that were dislodged from panels such as:
-Main altimeter reading 5320 ft.
-Horizontal situation indicator (HSI)
-The radio altimeter reading 30 ft.
-The gyro indicator showing the aircraft bank at 5 to 7 degrees
-Several other standard indicators
[NOBODY BOTHERED TO TAKE PART NUMBERS, EVEN THOUGH SEVERAL OF THEM STILL HAD THE ORIGINAL NUMBERS ON THEM.]
This would be important in the argument that the crashed plane numbers do not match with those of the presidential helicopter. There was an obvious hostility by the USA team especially Mr. Dennis Jones towards the Russian representing KAZAN HELICOPTERS whom he would not allow near the wreckage. He later had to request the Russian to show him the location of the black box after he failed.
The units we found at NWA were circuit breaker panel, a laser unit with serial number 1467605, and aircrafts main battery. According to the contract #800/07506317/72111 dated 21 July 2005 and the certificate for receiving the equipment after overhaul the unit number on the presidential breaker panel helicopter was actually 009460002.

*The main finding here was that if the aircraft was equipped with an EGPWS (enhanced ground proximity warning system) this system would have warned the pilot of immediate danger; otherwise it might not have been functional or never was installed as claimed. The presidential chopper has Low Altitude Radio Altimeter (Range 0-300 meters) N0 –A-037(17040) which could do the same function.
In the third area where the main wreckage was located, the following parts were found on the left side:
*a- The two engines burnt from the outside, the serial number of the first is
9TL 5T2-9914, 13393-11206, the second engine could not be identified.

(The engine part numbers of the presidential helicopter according to the overhaul contract #800/07506317/72111 were: Left engine # 7087882702002, Right engine # 7087882402215)
It is obvious that the part recovered from the wreckage does not match that which is on record for the presidential helicopter.
b- Tail rotor gear box part # 8AT-7400 serial #195032
c- Tail rotor hub part #2463904-000: MX-971002 with complete #MX674204 was what was found at the scene. According to contract #800/07506317/72111 the presidential helicopter was equipped with type/drawing # 8-1930-000802 and instrument cert. # 5387.
d- CVR P-507 unit #78A-220 serial#169 audio cassette unit 78A-80 serial #950 was what was found at the crash site. According to contract #800/07506317/72111, the presidential helicopter was actually equipped with voice recorder # TI-507-3bc [096112]
e- FDR SARPP-12D1M unit #K12-51DM version 2 serial#4090224 is what was found at the crash site. According to contract #800/07506317/72111 the presidential helicopters FDR holds the number K12-5IDM62 (4890706). The cashed helicopter was as such. The information released from contract #800/07506317/72111 is as follows:

The FDR SARPP-12D1M was a photo –recorder type system capable of recording of seven flight parameters and five on/off incident signals during thee previous nine hours of flight. The unit K12-51DM veers. 2 Ser. # 4090224 of FDR SARPP-12D1M was removed on August 24, 2005 from its transport container and a visual inspection was conducted. The exterior casing of the unit exhibited mechanical and thermal damage. After the casing was opened, the interior mechanisms of the unit showed evidence of high temperature influence and soot. The film amount indicator was visually observed to be at a position below zero. Typically, this indication shows the amount of film remaining on the supply spool.

To avoid film record damage by ambient light, the separation of the cassette (KS-05 Serial # 4090224-1) and film removal was conducted in a photo laboratory (dark room). A video record of the film/spool examination was made with the use of infrared vision.

After the cassette was opened, it was discovered that no film remained on the supply spool. The protection cover of the receiving spool was opened, and it was discovered that the film on the receiving spool was approximately 1/3 of the full spool capacity. The end of the film was jammed inside the exposure path of the cassette. The absence of film on the supply spool indicated that there was no record of the information during the accident. It was not possible to estimate the time and date the record stopped on the receiving spool.

After removing the film (the polyamide photo film tape) was found melted (fused together). The spool with the film was cut and the film mass removed from the reel. Attempts to separate layers of the film were not successful. The condition of the tape did not allow film processing and information readout. The thermal influence on the film resulted in photographic layer destruction. If this does not somehow indicate foul play there is even further evidence to support the following claim.

C. Translated transcript on AF605 on July 30th, 2005 from telephone 320907
Time Agency Text
1720```` Katanaka Hallo
Musoke Good evening sir
Katanaka Somebody called from COT (chief of operations and training) office inquiring the where about of the helicopter which went to Gulu.
Musoke From COT Office?
Katanaka Who was that?
Musoke Did you coordinate the flight until Gulu?
Musoke Yes, Katanaka Who was calling? Was it COT Bombo or Airport?
Musoke Somebody at the Airport called me. It seems down here.
Katanaka Find out, you have an extension in Area Control Center.
Musoke is it in the book?
Katanaka Somewhere on the board there and call me back.
Musoke is it the liaison office?
Katanaka Yes.
Musoke O.K. let me deal with the liaison office.
Katanaka Then you call me back.
1740 Musoke (…….) Just wait (…….) my name is Fred from Area
(With liaison Control Centre in tower. There is a lot of noise! I will
Office) call you later.
1742 Liaison Are you the one who rang me earlier?
Musoke Actually I wanted to check if you tracked the helicopter going to Gulu and southern Sudan.
Liaison Who told you?
Musoke Somebody rang from COT office indicating the helicopter did not land in Gulu.
Liaison we have operations officers in Gulu and we have operation zones.
Musoke Anyway that is it?
Katanaka You calls radar and find out if they saw the helicopter cross the border.
Musoke At that level?!!!... Haa…. I don’t think so… Anyway let me try.

1753 Musoke to Radar lost contact 24 minutes after take off at about 40
Katanaka miles away; unless you have somebody in Gulu who coordinate such a flight.

What was the interest of COT (Chief of Operations and Training of Ugandan Army)? Why were they following the movement of the presidential helicopter? From the transcript, the airport authorities were worried about how COT Bombo knew about the flight path of the presidential helicopter. It was not the presidential helicopter that the army was following, they where following their own helicopter for reasons we don’t understand. The following needs to be investigated. Why were they following that helicopter?

D. Details of CVR AF605 (AF615)
I have two versions of translation. The Ugandan an army’s version and the official investigated committee version. None of the following seems to be serious about translating what was actually contained in the black-box. There was an English, Swahili, Buganda, and Russian version of the black box information. The SPLM delegation did not have the technical expertise to decipher the information that was provided amongst the various texts in question. Everything was either vague or unclear because nobody wanted to help the SPLM decipher the given information. I'm afraid what we heard in the black-box is already gone and no one has the ability to retrieve it. Otherwise what we have indicates the following. The helicopter was not stable during take-off. At 0:39:41 the chief pilot was joking and said that the helicopter had been "disciplined by the wind" (meaning the helicopter was flying smoothly). Despite the ATCO directive to move from 55 to 65 thousand feet, the pilot insisted on being at the altitude of 55 thousand feet. He said that he would ascend to 75 thousand feet until they had reached the border before descending to 55 thousand feet. The co-pilot knew that they had gone beyond the border. At 0:43:09 the chief pilot began trying to pinpoint there location. The co-pilot responded "It is 15, it is zone in". This indicates that they were not sure exactly where they were. The black-box transcript states that they thought they were either near Kit gum or Nimule. This was actually visual navigation. The plane never had the equipment that was supposed to be installed on the presidential helicopter. The details on the CVR leave a lot to be desired.

According to what little evidence we have, there are obvious signs of foul play. It is up to the people of Sudan to open their minds and seek the truth about what happened to our beloved hero and leader Dr. John Garang de Mabior. I call upon Sudanese concern to form a commission to investigate the possible murder of seven of its sons. This not the end, but the beginning, there is more to come.

Aleu Ayieny Aleu
_________________

By Aleu Ayieny Aleu (Former Intelligent of SPLA/M)